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■Book Review
Ronald L. Sandler, The Ethics of Species: An Introduction. Cambridge University Press,
2012. 245 pages.
Ronald L. Sandler's The Ethics of Species: An Introduction is an ambitious applied ethics
book that purports to develop an ethics of species, roughly an assessment of the moral
relevance of species. In doing so, Sandler sets his eyes on two unrelated topics—the
problem of conservation of species in the wake of global climate change, and questions
regarding the use of new and emerging technologies to develop new kinds of species,
including human enhancement. Sandler overpromises, delivering neither a comprehensive
ethics of species, nor an introduction to the topic.
The book is generally well written, and the reader will always have a good idea of what
Sandler takes himself to be doing in each chapter. Rather than a comprehensive introduction
to moral questions surrounding the value of species as the name and summary would have
you believe, the book is comprised, roughly, of three sections. The first two chapters can be
described as doing work in metabiology and metaethics. The next three chapters are
concerned with a very narrow topic—what stance conservationists should take with regard to
conserving species in the wake of global climate change. The last three chapters before the
book's conclusion tackle a radically different topic—whether or not it is morally acceptable to
create new artificial species and new human species through human enhancement.
Although Sandler promises to offer “an ethics of species”, in the first chapter Sandler
readily admits there is no consensus regarding the meaning of terms like "species" and
"biodiversity." Unfortunately Sandler never offers a definitive account of what these terms
mean—problematic if his goal is to offer an ethics of "species"; rather at times he will treat
the terms as meaning what various professionals mean by them, such as in chapter 3 where
these terms are used, roughly, as the conservation biologist would use them. In contrast, the
second chapter offers a clear account of the ethical terms he uses throughout the book,
defining two kinds of value. The first is instrumental value—or value as a means to an end.
The second is intrinsic value, of which there are two kinds—subjective intrinsic value, which
is roughly the value that a keepsake might have to an individual, and objective intrinsic value,
which is the value things have in and of themselves.
The second chapter purports to examine what kinds of value species and biodiversity have,
contending that biodiversity and species value is generally instrumental value. He concludes
that many species do not have substantial instrumental value, and thus preservation of species
is, largely, unnecessary (this conclusion determines his stance in the next three chapters).
Sandler's discussion of alternative theories of species value is sparse—he discusses two
theories regarding the objective value of species, then bizarrely discusses a theory about the
objective value of individual members of a species. More problematic, Sandler seems
oblivious to the fact that biologists readily admit that they have a fallible and relatively
shallow understanding of environmental biology, as such, much of the instrumental value of
species (at least in preserving the environment as we like it) may very well be hidden value.
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In later chapters, he advocates allowing the extinction of many species and allowing
ecosystems to adapt to new climates and other artificial influences. It is true that ecosystems
will often adapt over time, but this adaptation takes place over long periods of time -- it may
take decades or centuries to recover from our carelessly allowing even one species to become
extinct.
In chapters three through five Sandler tackles the problem of preservation of species given
global climate change. Contemporary conservation strategies rely upon segregating a portion
of nature from human interference, but global climate change cannot be segregated against,
and thus contemporary conservation strategies will fail to preserve species. Sandler, having
argued that biodiversity is largely morally insignificant, advocates that conservationists revise
their goals and allow many species to become extinct. The problem with this position is that
global climate change is uncontroversially harmful to moral agents like us independent of the
fact that it will cause mass extinctions. Advocating alternative conservationist strategies is a
lot like advocating alternative firefighting strategies after the firefighters help arsonists to
replace the town's water supply with gasoline, and sat back as they started lighting fires. The
most efficient firefighting strategy is to prevent the arsonists from replacing the water supply
with gas, and the most efficient conservationist strategy is to take steps to stop climate change.
If climate change is left unchecked, droughts will cause massive crop failures which will
result in the deaths of millions of people across the world, and we have a strong moral
obligation to stop that regardless of whether we have a strong moral obligation to preserve
biodiversity.
In chapters six through eight, Sandler claims to morally evaluate contemporary topics in
bioengineering, including the creation of new species and a post-human species brought about
by human enhancement. Problematically, Sandler takes the position that there are no good
arguments for or against many of the positions discussed in the latter half of the book, and
thus the topic is somehow extra-moral, or outside the realm of ethics. However, ethics is the
branch of philosophy that attempts to answer the question, "What should I do?," and as such
there can be no situation where something is neither morally acceptable or morally
unacceptable; the idea that something is neither morally acceptable nor unacceptable is
incoherent.
By arguing that species creation and human enhancement are somehow amoral, in a sense
Sandler argues that it doesn't matter whether we engage in creating artificial species; but
surely this is a mistake. There are potential risks and rewards to creating new kinds of life,
just as there are potential risks and rewards for letting a species go extinct. It is for these
reasons that we need a comprehensive theory of ethics of species—a means to evaluate
whether these risks are worth taking. Sandler does not provide this, and thus he fails to
provide an ethics of species.
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